Dans le cadre du séminaire Gouvernance hebdomadaire, Clément Fontan viendra présenter ses travaux autour de l'implication des banques centrales dans les questions environnementales.
Central bankers could not make it clearer today: they are strongly committed to mitigating the impact of climate change on our economic systems. Yet, at the same time, they implement programmes to stabilize hypertrophied and fragile financial systems, and purchase bonds from car manufacturers, energy companies, private water corporations. They also ease the financing of multinational firms with a large carbon footprint. The first aim of Clément Fontant's paper is to understand why central bankers' deeds do not match this word. The normative and theoretical justifications for the current level of independence enjoyed by central bankers around the world are at odds with a reorientation of monetary policy towards green objectives. In fact, since the spread of the Central bank independence (CBI) template in the 1990's, central bankers do not have the democratic legitimacy to follow other objectives than price stability The second aim of the paper is to show the fragility of the current efforts of central banks to subsume their environmental efforts under the CBI framework. Clément demonstrates that, unless central banks give up central planks of the CBI framework and a certain degree of their operational independence, their efforts in greening the financial system are likely to be nothing but hot air.