Publication Type:

Articles

Source:

Natures Sciences Sociétés, EDP Sciences, Issue 4, p.404-412 (2004)

ISBN:

1240-1307

Call Number:

halshs-00382768

URL:

https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00382768

Keywords:

confiance.

Abstract:

The credibility and guarantee due to the certification mechanism theoretically comes from the control society's independence and expertise. In the case of the information about the GMO or non GMO character of the food and agricultural products, these conditions are not sufficient, for lack of a stabilized definition of the control methods. However, professionals in the supply chain often turn to certification societies in order to make their exchanges more reliable concerning this information. This article analyses the way certification works in these conditions. It shows that certification societies use the knowledges and agreements which are constructed by the concerned actors, that they work to formalize the good intentions of the certified industrialists, and finally promise a guarantee on the industrial practices thanks their own reputation. Rather than a definitive and universal conclusion of the controversy about the proofs of the GMOs' « absence », certification societies allow a local compromise between the demands for proofs from the customer societies and the investments consented by the suppliers. Turning to certification constitutes then a sufficient proof for industrialists, a sort of conventional agreement. Certification is a private regulation mechanism which is considered, at least locally and temporarily, sufficient not to challenge at any moment the necessary coordination for market exchanges : it's at least considered as more satisfying than the only intervention of public authorities.La crédibilité de la garantie apportée par la certification provient en principe de l'indépendance et de l'expertise de l'organisme de contrôle. Dans le cas de l'information sur la caractéristique OGM ou non OGM des produits agroalimentaires, ces conditions sont insuffisantes, faute de méthodes de contrôle jugées fiables. L'article analyse le fonctionnement de la certification dans ces conditions. Il montre que son succès relatif repose, plutôt que sur une véritable clôture de la controverse sur les preuves de l'« absence » d'OGM, sur un compromis conventionnel entre les exigences des entreprises clientes et les investissements consentis par les fournisseurs. Le recours à la certification constitue un mécanisme de régulation privée considéré, au moins localement et temporairement, comme suffisant pour ne pas remettre en cause incessamment les échanges commerciaux, et en tous cas plus satisfaisant que la seule intervention des pouvoirs publics.

Notes:

Humanities and Social Sciences/SociologyJournal articles

filet
Tag biblio: